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MONTANA'S CONSTITUTIONALLY
ESTABLISHED INVESTMENT PROGRAM:
A State Investing Against Itself*
Wendy A. Fitzgerald**
Montana's 1889 Constitution contained dozens of sections de-
tailing an extremely conservative scheme for the investment of
Montana's public funds.' The 1972 Constitutional Convention re-
placed the 1889 provisions with a single section unifying the in-
vestment of all Montana trust funds under a single state agency.
The convention's Revenue and Finance Committee majority report
provided no more than legislative supervision of investments and
the unified program. The minority report also endorsed unifying
state investments, but advocated retaining from the 1889 Constitu-
tion a prohibition on investment in corporate common stock for all
but state retirement trust funds. The minority prevailed on the
convention floor, and its plan-still vastly simplified from the 1889
version-now governs the investment of Montana's more than 2.6
billion dollars in various trust funds.2 That provision reads in per-
tinent part:
The legislature shall provide for a unified investment program for
public funds and provide rules therefor, including supervision of
investment of surplus funds of all counties, cities, towns, and
other local government entities .... Except for monies contrib-
uted to retirement funds, no public funds shall be invested in pri-
vate corporate capital stock.'
* The author thanks the University of Montana School of Law and the MONTANA LAW
REVIEW for organizing Constitutional Symposium '89 at which she presented this article.
The author extends special thanks to Judge Gordon Bennett, Conference Coordinator, and
Mae Nan Ellingson, Finance Panel moderator, for their assistance in preparing the author
for participation in the Symposium, and to Lawrence Turk and Daniel Kemmis for the
background information they provided for this article. Finally, the author thanks the editors
and staff of the MONTANA LAW REVIEW for their assistance in preparing this article for publi-
cation. Any errors or omissions, however, are the author's alone.
** B.A., Reed College, (1978); M.A., University of Virginia, (1980); J.D., University of
Montana, (1989); Law Clerk, The Honorable Thomas Tang, Circuit Judge, United States
Circuit Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
1. See MONT. CONST. of 1889, arts. XI, XII, XXI; Montana Constitutional Convention
Commission, Montana Constitutional Convention Occasional Papers, Report No. 5, Com-
parison of the Montana Constitution with the Constitutions of Selected Other States
(1971) [hereinafter Comparison of the Montana Constitution] for a compilation of the 1889
trust fund and investment provisions.
2. STATE OF MONTANA BOARD OF INVESTMENTS, 1987-1988 FIscAL YEAR REP. 1 (1988)
[hereinafter BOARD OF INVESTMENTS].
3. MONT. CONST. art. VIII, § 13.
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This constitutional provision commands our attention because 2.6
billion dollars in investment funds has vast potential for good or
for ill.
The convention debate over the two proposals synthesized sev-
eral strains of Montana's character and history. In this article I
examine the major historical influences on the convention's delib-
erations; by turn, progressivism, populism, and conservatism. I
then contrast the delegates' vision for state investment with its ac-
tual implementation. Although the convention approved a plan of
public accountability, instate investment, and preventing state
conflicts of interest, the actual program has failed to realize these
hopes. At fault, however, is perhaps not our constitution, but a
failure of our confidence as a people to control the use of our state
capital resources.
I. PROGRESSIVE INFLUENCES
Montana's progressive political tradition grew from the "pro-
gressive era" in American history spanning the turn of the cen-
tury.4 Slum housing, malnutrition, poverty, child labor, and exploi-
tive working conditions blighted the national landscape.
Reformers of the era identified unresponsive government and the
massing of wealth and power in business trusts and monopolies as
the roots of these social evils.' Indeed, big business controlled
many aspects of local, state, and national government through the
firm grip of corruption.7 Government, reformers believed, could not
even moderate the ill effects of industrialization until government
was returned to the people.8 The chief tenet of progressive political
reform, therefore, was to restructure government to shield it from
corruption and to grant sway to the popular will. In state and local
politics, progressives across the nation achieved such lasting re-
forms as centralization, the popular election of senators, and public
regulation of utilities.'
In Montana, progressives waged a bitter struggle against the
chokehold the Anaconda Company maintained on Montana state
government, press, and labor.10 In 1920, the progressive Joseph M.
4. S. MORRISON, H. COMMAGER & W. LEUCHTENBURG, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE
AMERICAN REPUBLIC 499 (1977) [hereinafter MORRISON].
5. Id. at 499-509.
6. Id. at 500.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 508-10.
10. See K.R. TOOLE, TWENTIETH CENTURY MONTANA: A STATE OF EXTREMES 233-71
(1972) [hereinafter TOOLE].
1990]
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Dixon won a divisive campaign for the governor's office and at-
tempted to implement many of the reforms other states had
achieved. In his State of the State address to the 1921 Legislature,
Dixon proposed sweeping tax reforms and legislative--reapportion-
ment designed to loosen Anaconda Company's hold on the state."
Through several of Dixon's proposals, such as centralizing state
purchasing, appointing an independent and professional state
Board of Equalization, and streamlining state bureaucracy, Dixon
hoped to restructure government itself to insulate it from the
Company's influence and to assure democratic control.1" Labelling
Dixon a "radical" and a "liar," the Company's lobbyists discred-
ited Dixon and easily defeated his reforms. 13 Montana's era of pro-
gressivism ended, and little changed in Montana government for
the next several decades."
The history of the state's investment programs reflects the
consistent defeat of progressive reform in Montana until the 1970s.
From 1924 through 1971, by constitutional amendments, legislative
efforts, and finally executive directive, progressives strove to cen-
tralize and to regulate the administration and investment of Mon-
tana's many trust funds."5 A growing and disjointed state bureau-
cracy comprised of 188 different agencies, each jealously guarding
its autonomy, had frustrated these efforts.16 By 1969, eighteen dif-
ferent boards or commissions administered Montana trust funds,
employing different and virtually unregulated accounting methods
and strategies." The Constitutional Convention Commission re-
ported to the 1972 Revenue and Finance Committee, "Of the
thirty-three accounts invested, a yield was reported for only four;
the state had no idea what kind of total return it was making on its
investments.' 8
By the 1972 Constitutional Convention, however, progressiv-
ism had resurfaced in Montana. On the national scene, progres-
sives railed against state bureaucracy as incomprehensibly big and
shamefully inefficient.' 9 Echoing their progressive ancestors, the
11. Id. at 255-58.
12. Id. at 257-58.
13. Id. at 264.
14. Id. at 271.
15. R. Barber, Montana Constitutional Convention Studies: Report No. 15, Taxation
and Finance 237-38 (1971) [hereinafter Barber].
16. J. LOPACH, WE THE PEOPLE OF MONTANA ... THE WORKINGS OF A POPULAR GOVERN-
MENT 115-16, 176-78 (J. Lopach ed. 1983) [hereinafter WE THE PEOPLE]; Barber, supra note
15, at 237.
17. BARBER, supra note 15, at 238-39.
18. Id. at 239.
19. WE THE PEOPLE, supra note 16, at 174-76.
380 [Vol. 51
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reformers of the 1960s and 1970s advocated the restructuring of
government to eradicate corruption and incompetence and to as-
sure responsiveness to people's needs and desires. In forty-one
states, progressives achieved some form of government reorganiza-
tion during these decades. 0 In Montana, the 1969 Legislature ap-
pointed an executive reorganization commission, which reported
that "the executive branch has grown into a cumbersome, frag-
mented and haphazard collection of autonomous agencies ...
Comprehensive reorganization ... is necessary to insure that gov-
ernment will be maintained in an efficient and responsive man-
ner."2' Concerned not only for efficiency, but also for public partic-
ipation in government, the commission advocated reform because
"it [was] impossible for the electorate to meaningfully fix definitive
and true responsibility anywhere for the administration of govern-
mental affairs."22 Responding to the commission report, by consti-
tutional amendment in 1970 and legislative and executive order in
1971, Montana completely overhauled its state bureaucracy.2 3
The 1971 reforms streamlined state government and strength-
ened the governor's authority over the executive branch.24 The re-
forms included consolidating the administration and investment of
all state funds under a single Board of Investments.2" Like Dixon's
progressive proposal for an independent and professional Board of
Equalization free of corruption and incompetence, the law mandat-
ing the new Board of Investments required gubernatorial appoint-
ment, so members would be "informed and experienced in the field
of investments. 26
Although the legislature had finally accomplished these pro-
gressive reforms a year before the constitutional convention met,
the delegates feared a return to Montana's past history of an un-
constrained state bureaucracy and unregulated investment pro-
gram. Delegates forcefully described on the convention floor the
inefficiencies, and indeed irresponsibility, found in the past admin-
istration of state trust funds.27 When the Chairman introduced the
Revenue and Finance Committee's majority report, therefore, he
argued for conferring constitutional certainty on the recent re-
20. Id. at 176.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 177.
23. Id. at 116, 177-78.
24. Id. at 177-78.
25. Barber, supra note 15, at 237.
26. Id.
27. V MONTANA CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION TRANSCRIPTS 1529 (1981) [hereinafter
TRANSCRIPTS].
1990]
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forms. Said Delegate Rygg, "The Committee feels the importance
of unity, professional treatment and supervision of all public fund
investments should be stressed at the constitutional level."28
Constitutional establishment of a unified state investment
program was but one aspect of the convention's progressive efforts
to reform permanently the state bureaucracy. Other constitutional
provisions, for example, limited bureaucratic growth to twenty ex-
ecutive departments," placed the executive branch firmly under
the governor's control,30 and assured public participation in execu-
tive agency decision-making." In these provisions too, the conven-
tion gave constitutional importance to recently enacted progressive
reforms of the state bureaucracy. These constitutional revisions,
like the unified investment program mandate, reflected the pro-
gressive desire to achieve professional and efficient management of
state government.
Because of the seeming daunting complexity of the financial
world, professional management of state investments struck some
delegates to the convention as particularly important. Several of
the delegates expressed their personal mystification about invest-
ments and their desire to entrust state funds to financial experts.32
Of the twenty or so delegates who spoke on the investment propo-
sal, several rose just to ask questions, and many qualified their re-
marks by disparaging their financial knowledge.3 3 The Chairman of
the Revenue and Finance Committee himself seemed to sum up
many of the delegates' attitudes when he explained why he had
participated so little in the debate. "I recognize when I have tal-
ent," Delegate Rygg said, "and I yield to the affluent man and the
banker when it comes to talking about investments. We listened
for hours to the Investment Board; we feel [the trust funds are] in
good hands. '3
In part to assure that professional expertise would guide Mon-
tana's investment strategy, the majority report of the Revenue and
Finance Committee recommended abolishing the investment
prohibitions of the 1889 Constitution in favor of legislative super-
vision.3 5 The committee had learned that although other states'
constitutions included mild investment restrictions, Montana's
28. Id. at 1516-17.
29. MONT. CONST. art. VI, § 7.
30. MONT. CONST. art. VI, § 8.
31. MONT. CONST. art. II, § 8.
32. V TRANSCRIPTS, supra note 27, at 1522, 1523, 1529-30.
33. Id. at 1523.
34. Id. at 1530.
35. Id. at 1518.
[Vol. 51
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1889 Constitution was the only attempt to prescribe constitution-
ally a specific investment program." The committee had learned
further that wherever the 1889 Constitution had locked state funds
into government bonds, for example, yields had suffered from in-
flation and missed opportunities in other investment vehicles.3 7
Calling the 1889 investment structure "obsolete" and citing exam-
ples of sister states with five times the rate of return Montana had
enjoyed, delegates urged permitting the legislature to establish an
investment program administered by financial experts." Explained
Delegate Heliker, "[W]e do not have the picture before us of the
Legislature sitting down and actually doing this investment itself.
It will turn the job over to experts. And it seems to me that this is
the way it should be handled and that we should not try to freeze
[any investment restrictions] into the Constitution. ' 3
No one challenged unifying state investment funds constitu-
tionally, the chief progressive contribution to the proposed provi-
sion. The proposal to free all investment funds from constitutional
restrictions and to submit those funds to legislative supervision,
however, sparked controversy. The convention ultimately adopted
the committee's minority proposal to prevent the investment of all
but pension funds in corporate common stock.40 That constitu-
tional restriction defeated the progressive move to permit total
flexibility in state investment. The opponents of flexibility did not
represent special interests as had the foes of progressive ideas in
Montana's past. Rather, the debate over restricting state invest-
ment turned on delegates' attitudes toward two other forces in
Montana's history, populism and Montanans' struggle to eke a liv-
ing from this land.
II. POPULIST INFLUENCES
The majority's proposal to abolish constitutional restrictions
on investment and to permit legislative establishment of invest-
ment programs forwarded the progressive principle of government
accountability to the people. Advocates of the majority report
echoed this populist strain of progressivism when they argued that
36. See generally Comparison of the Montana Constitution, supra note 1; Barber,
supra note 15, at 252.
37. Barber, supra note 15, at 240-54.
38. V TRANSCRIPTS, supra note 27, at 1517, 1528.
39. Id. at 1526.
40. MONT. CONST. art. VIII, § 13. The convention concluded that state employees
ought to decide for themselves whether to invest their retirement funds in common stock. V
TRANSCRIPTS, supra note 27, at 1529, 1537.
1990]
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a legislature accountable to the people of Montana should deter-
mine how to invest their public funds. Remarked Delegate Joyce:
I am willing to trust the people of Montana who they'll elect to
the Legislature. If they elect people to the Legislature that are
crooks, we can turn back the course of history and we can resur-
rect the vigilante committees and hang some people from the
Capitol dome.... But I'm not afraid of the future or afraid of the
people of Montana, and I submit the progressive majority report.
41
The convention debate, then, turned to who should control the
state's capital resources: the experts, the legislators, the people, or
the constitution. While progressives had long fought for the popu-
lar control of government, populists had long fought for the control
of capital. Indeed, the convention debate on control of state capital
recalled to some delegates Montana's populist history.
Political populism arose on the national scene in the agricul-
tural west after the American Civil War. Grangers and Farmers'
Alliance members learned to overcome economic hardship through
cooperatively owned enterprises such as grain elevators and reaper
factories.42 By 1890, the Farmers' Alliances had spawned a plat-
form and candidates to carry their political message.4 3 These popu-
lists advocated the substitution of government for bank control of
currency, a graduated income tax, public ownership of utilities and
railroads, and public financing for farmers." The populist move-
ment remained a national minority, but was a creative influeice in
American politics until World War II.15
In Montana, populism never grew as strong as in North Da-
kota, for example, where the movement achieved a state bank. In
1914, however, Montana voters passed a ballot initiative dedicating
a portion of the constitutionally established School Land Trust
Fund for investment in first mortgages in Montana farms.46 Al-
though the impetus for "Farm Loan Law" may have been the
homesteading boosterism of the pre-drought years, the law none-
theless was populist in placing the capital of the people under the
control of the people for the benefit of the people. Between 1917
and 1933, the program eventually extended over four million dol-
41. V TRANSCRIPTS, supra note 27, at 1530.
42. MORRISON, supra note 4, at 434.
43. Id. at 437.
44. Id. at 437-39.
45. Id. at 439.
46. Toole County Irrigation Dist. v. State, 104 Mont. 420, 432, 67 P.2d 989, 992 (1937).
[Vol. 51
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lars in loans to Montana farmers.47
Politically, Montana populism reached its zenith in 1920 when
the state's populist Non-Partisan League grew to 20,000 mem-
bers.4 8 Angry farmers filled these ranks after three years of devas-
tating drought, over a hundred agricultural bank closures, and a
failed state bond program to employ drought-stricken farmers
building county roads.4 9 Free of the strong-arm tactics the Ana-
conda Company used to intimidate labor, the farmers of the Non-
Partisan League openly challenged the state's taxation policies,
which impoverished counties and enriched the Company. 50 The
Non-Partisan League backed Jeannette Rankin's successful con-
gressional bid, but its support of Burton K. Wheeler's failed guber-
natorial campaign against the more moderate Dixon marked the
end of the League's political influence in Montana.51 The Company
press excoriated Wheeler as "Bolshevist Burt" for his Non-Parti-
san League ties and painted the contest between Dixon and
Wheeler as "a matter of freedom versus Socialist slavery. '52 The
anti-socialist hysteria that eventually crushed the populists politi-
cally in Montana was the vanguard of the early "red scare"
nationally.5 3
The Depression dealt the death blow to the populist Farm
Loan program. By 1935, the program had lost every penny of the
more than four million dollars loaned54 as Montana farmers suf-
fered their second decade of dustbowl-creating drought. The exo-
dus of Montana homesteaders continued . 5 Bound by the 1889 con-
stitutional provision declaring the School Land Trust Fund
"inviolate," the 1935 Legislature acknowledged the state's respon-
sibility for the lost funds."' The legislature began a repayment pro-
gram from taxes of all the principal and interest lost in the disas-
ter.57 It was not until 1953 that the School Land Trust Fund
finally recouped all the funds lost in the Farm Loan program. 8
No delegate to the 1972 Constitutional Convention argued
47. Id. at 432-38, 67 P.2d at 992-94; V TRANSCRI-rS, supra note 27, at 1540.
48. TOOLE, supra note 10, at 241.
49. Id. at 241.
50. Id. at 241-42.
51. Id. at 235, 238-48.
52. Id. at 247.
53. Montana's repressive Sedition Law became the model for national legislation in
1918. Id. at 155.
54. Toole County Irrigation Dist. v. State, 104 Mont. 420, 437, 67 P.2d 989, 994 (1937).
55. See TOOLE, supra note 10, at 80-81.
56. Toole County Irrigation Dist., 104 Mont. at 437-38, 67 P.2d at 994.
57. Id. at 438, 67 P.2d at 994.
58. V TRANSCRIPTS, supra note 27, at 1540.
1990]
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openly or consciously for popular control of state investment capi-
tal, but supporters of the minority proposal to prohibit investment
in common stock nonetheless advanced populist themes. When
Delegate Artz introduced the minority report on the floor, he
presented it as a constitutional scheme for investment priorities:
"[Niumber one, security; number two, that the funds should be
invested in Montana as much as possible; and that the final con-
sideration is the return on the investment .... [K]eep the money
in Montana."5'9 Delegate Artz thus stressed security of trust fund
principal as the first priority, but made investment of public capi-
tal within the state a higher priority than profit. Like his populist
predecessors, Delegate Artz sought to secure public capital for the
benefit of the people through investment in Montana enterprises.
Delegate Artz further proposed that the constitution prohibit in-
vestment in common stock so that the legislature would not face a
conflict of interest by serving as both a shareholder in and regula-
tor of Montana industries.6 0
The debate then turned to the wisdom of freezing an invest-
ment plan into the constitution. Some delegates expressed the pro-
gressive version of populism by supporting supervision of state in-
vestments by the legislature. 1 The minority proposal, expressed
populism at its most fundamental by attempting to assure popular
control of and popular benefit from state capital in the state's or-
ganic law.
Proponents of the majority proposal repeatedly stressed the
ability of expert financiers to increase state funds in the stock mar-
ket.62 Delegates rising in support of the minority report, however,
expressed a kind of populist distrust of experts and legislators
both. None felt constrained to qualify his or her remarks with
apologies for lack of financial expertise. Rather, they seemed to as-
sume that ordinary citizens were competent to make investment
decisions, indeed were perhaps more competent than experts or
legislators. Time and again the proponents of the minority report
cited historical examples of experts' costly folly-tulip bulb invest-
ments, real estate speculation, and the 1929 crash-and their fear
that experts could "pressure" the legislature into such risky ven-
tures unless a constitutional ban prevented them. 3 Again Delegate
Artz summed up the case against experts when he observed:
59. Id. at 1519 (emphasis added).
60. Id. at 1519-20.
61. See, e.g., id. at 1525, 1529-30.
62. Id. at 1525, 1528-30.
63. Id. at 1519, 1522, 1531, 1532-33, 1534-35.
[Vol. 51
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Mr. Drum said we could get good investment counsel and that
that would insure us that we wouldn't lose any money in the
stock market. Now, I've put some money in mutual funds, and
they supposedly have real good investment counsel; they have
computers and analyze the market and the whole thing. But look
at their record, even the best of them. Some of them barely kept
up with the Dow-Jones, and some of them went broke."
Distrust of the touted experts and faith in their own common-
sense ability to design a state investment program to benefit
Montanans were populist sentiments the minority report advocates
unwittingly expressed.
The convention's adoption of the minority proposal was
clearly an endorsement of the populist instate investment scheme
Delegate Artz had outlined. The language of the minority report
failed to express this intent, however, and thus accomplished no
more than prohibiting the investment of all but state pension
funds in common stock. 5 To the extent that the delegates ex-
pressed approval of using Montana state capital for Montanans
and exercised their own popular control rather than leaving invest-
ment decisions to the experts, however, the convention reflected
and affirmed Montanans' historical populist character. Other pro-
visions in the 1972 Constitution indeed manifested the conven-
tion's populist viewpoint. Provisions for popular sovereignty, the
right to know and to participate in government processes, direct
democracy through ballot initiatives, and the mandate for periodic
review of the constitution itself all reflected Montana's populist
spirit. 6
III. THE INFLUENCE OF CONSERVATISM AND THE LAND
The decisive arguments in the convention debate over the ma-
jority and minority proposals expressed telling attitudes toward
holding a legacy of funds in trust for future generations and Mon-
tana's experience with an economy dependent on resource extrac-
tion. Proponents of the majority report spoke of their belief in an
expanding American economy that would realize great returns in
the future if the state could but seize opportunities in flexible in-
vestment strategies.6 Delegate Drum voiced these sentiments in
patriotic tones when he concluded:
64. Id. at 1537.
65. MONT. CONST. art. VIII, § 13.
66. WE THE PEOPLE, supra note 16, at 10-11.
67. V TRANSCRUPrS, supra note 27, at 1525, 1529-30.
1990] 387
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But I think it really all boils down to this: the American system of
private enterprise ain't too bad. It's a growing economy. There
may be losers, and there are a lot of winners. But if we have faith
in that economy and are willing to allow our people [via the legis-
lature] to make the decision of whether they want to participate
in the growth of the American economy, I think this Constitution
should allow them that latitude."
Delegate Drum's words epitomize the "frontier optimism" that
propelled early pioneers into the western wilderness and still char-
acterizes Americans as expansive, fast-paced, "go-ahead" people."9
More persuasive to the convention delegates, however, was
Montana's own history of economic "boom and bust." Supporters
of the minority report argued that a constitutional prohibition on
common stock investment might slow growth, but it would also
protect state trust funds from the kind of disastrous losses the
state had experienced throughout its history.70 Delegates repeat-
edly referred to the "homestead boom collapse" of the 1920s and
1930s, which forced the state to repay School Land Trust Fund
principal loaned under the Farm Loan Program.7 ' Indeed, over the
decades since statehood each of Montana's resource-based indus-
tries-agriculture, mining, and timber-had raised Montanans'
hopes high during the booms, only to dash them and Montanans'
standard of living during the busts.72 Shortly before the constitu-
tional convention met, the University of Montana's Bureau of Bus-
iness Research issued the first comprehensive study of Montana's
economy, revealing per capita income fourteen percent below the
national average, a projection of a further seven percent decline by
1980, and the conclusion that the state was "economically stag-
nant. ' 73 Delegates painting a rosy economic future of growing in-
vestment funds could not overcome the hard-learned pessimism of
most.
Rather than risk trust funds in flexible investments, most del-
egates voiced the simple desire to preserve and protect them. Re-
sponding to criticism of the slow growth of Montana trust funds,
Delegate Romney said, "I want to be sure that we don't lose any-
thing. I'm not so concerned about gaining as I am keeping what we
have .... And that is why we must scrupulously guard this inheri-
68. Id. at 1530.
69. R. BILLINGTON, AMERICA'S FRONTIER HERITAGE 225-26 (1974).
70. V TRANSCRIPTS, supra note 27, at 1519, 1522-23, 1524, 1527, 1531, 1532-33, 1534-
35, 1537, 1539-40.
71. Id. at 1534, 1539-40.
72. TOOLE, supra note 10, at 284-85.
73. Id. at 282.
388 [Vol. 51
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tance. . . .'", Delegate Romney's words captured a predominant
theme of the constitutional convention and of Montana public dis-
course since. One author in the newly published Montana literary
anthology has observed:
Innocence and self-destructiveness converge in today's Big Sky
country with its awareness of being the end of a tradition, the last
best place .... Having lost so much, how can we keep the little
that is left? This the unspoken fear behind public policy debate
in Montana, from concerns about protecting the wilderness, the
water, and the air to promoting free enterprise, economic devel-
opment, trade, and growth."5
Delegates to the 1972 convention were keenly aware of how
much Montana had lost from its resource extraction economy. Al-
though boosters promised great returns from the investment of
Montana's resources-be they financial or natural-Montana's ex-
perience is that of steady depletion. 76 Travelling to the convention
across a state scarred by sod busting, clear cutting, and strip min-
ing, the delegates arrived determined to preserve what was left of
Montana's natural legacy. When debating investment of Montana
trust funds, then, the delegates seemed to equate the funds with
the land itself. Though the School Land Trust is but a part of
Montana's investment pool, delegates often referred to that fund
as representative of the whole. "I'm sure glad that we didn't sell
that school section that [we were] going to get the great amount of
money on," replied Delegate Mahoney to promises of greater re-
turns on investments. Supporting the minority proposal, he contin-
ued, "And, thank goodness, we had farsighted people that wasn't
looking for the dollar and getting that; that they says, 'We'll just
hang on.' "7 The delegates saw themselves as heirs of Montana's
mountains, streams, plains, and trust funds. Their first concern,
then, was to "just hang on," to pass these resources to future gen-
erations undiminished if also unincreased. The constitutional pro-
visions for reclamation and protection of the environment and nat-
ural resources 78 could serve equally to represent the convention's
attitude about Montana trust funds. As Delegate Artz said in in-
troducing the minority proposal, the first priority was to secure the
74. V TRANSCRIPTS, supra note 27, at 1524-25.
75. Blew, Frontier Dreams, in THE LAST BEST PLACE: A MONTANA ANTHOLOGY 633 (W.
Kittredge & A. Smith ed. 1988) (emphasis in original).
76. TOOLE, supra note 10, at 281-82.
77. V TRANSCRIPTS, supra note 27, at 1534 (emphasis added).
78. MONT. CONST. art. IX, §§ 1, 2.
1990]
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principal, and the second was to "keep the money in Montana."79
Montana's history, the delegates recalled, was of continually
compromising its natural and human resources for economic gain.
Fear of perpetuating that cycle furthered the minority proposal to
ban investment in common stock. Without such a ban, Delegate
Artz reasoned, under the minority scheme for instate investment,
the state would own stock in Montana corporations." The possibil-
ity then arose that Montana would own stock in a company for
which the state had also required air-pollution controls. Playing
the role of company spokesperson, Delegate Artz challenged the
convention, "'Now here, listen here, fellows, we cannot go ahead
and put in all of this necessary equipment to keep those fumes
down; if we do, you're not going to get any return on your invest-
ment.' What position would that put the Legislature in?"'" In ap-
proving the minority proposal banning investment in common
stock, the convention thus hoped to prevent testing the legislature
with a devil's choice between profits for state trust funds and fur-
ther degradation of Montana's lands. When faced with such a
devil's choice in the past, Montana often had selected the profits,
countenancing the scarred landscape only to see the profits ulti-
mately flee the state anyway.82
IV. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CONSTITUTIONALLY ESTABLISHED
INVESTMENT PROGRAM
For the convention delegates, Montana's history had shaped
its new constitutionally established investment program. Progres-
sive elements had achieved a program accountable to the public
and safe from corruption, centralized under the government's ad-
ministrative arm. Populist elements had prioritized state invest-
ments so that Montana's capital resources would benefit
Montanans. Further, the people retained ultimate control of their
capital through their constitution. Finally, the conservative ele-
ments prevailed to hold Montana's funds in trust for future gener-
ations, preventing difficult choices between tempting gains and risk
to the principal and the land itself. In part because the actual pro-
vision they wrote failed to express the convention's investment
scheme, however, the delegates' vision has foundered.
First, the convention specifically rejected arguments favoring
expert control of investments so increased growth might provide
79. V TRANSCRIPTS, supra note 27, at 1519.
80. Id. at 1519-20.
81. Id. at 1520.
82. See TOOLE, supra note 10, at 281-82, 287-88.
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tax relief.8 3 Instead, the convention sought first to secure invest-
ment funds and second to invest them in Montana. Given the final
wording of the constitutional investment provision, however, the
legislature has implemented the very program the convention re-
jected. A joint interim subcommittee reported to the 1985 Legisla-
ture, "Maximum enhancement of earnings . . . is the objective of
the investment program because every dollar earned for state gov-
ernment is one that taxpayers will not have to contribute.
'a4
Second, the convention specifically rejected expert control of
state investment funds because it doubted experts' ability to invest
those funds both safely and for the benefit of Montana. The legis-
lature, however, has assured "expert" control of Montana invest-
ments by imposing the "prudent expert standard" on the invest-
ment of state funds.8 5 The prudent expert standard seems
innocuous enough, requiring that the Board of Investments act
with the "care, skill, prudence, and diligence" of a prudent ex-
pert.86 The prudent expert standard, however, imposes on Mon-
tana investment strategies both the perspective of a Wall Street
financier and the narrow investment criteria of securing the princi-
pal and maximizing returns. The standard thus thwarts the vision
of the 1972 convention in three critical areas: public accountability,
instate investment, and conflicts of interest.
A. Public Accountability
Centralization of state investment programs now makes it pos-
sible for Montanans to know where and how their state funds are
invested, but the "prudent expert" standard frustrates the power
of that knowledge. In theory, the constitutional right to know
dovetails with another guarantee, the right of Montanans to par-
ticipate "in the operation of the agencies prior to the final decision
.... " No citizen can meaningfully participate in Board of Invest-
ments operations and decisions, however, as long as the Board
must heed only its expert counsel.
In October of 1985, for example, the Board of Investments
agreed to meet with the Montana Peace Legislative Coalition to
hear its proposal for divestment of state funds from companies do-
83. Delegate Drum, advocate for the losing majority report, outlined the same invest-
ment plan the legislature now pursues. TRANSCRIPTS, supra note 27, at 1529-30.
84. JOINT INTERIM SUBCOMMITTEE No. 3, EFFECTIVE MANAGEMENT OF STATE INVEST-
MENTS: A REPORT TO THE 49TH LEGISLATURE 8 (Dec. 1984).
85. MONT. CODE ANN. § 17-6-201 (1989).
86. MONT. CODE ANN. § 17-6-201 (1989).
87. MONT. CONST. art. II, § 8.
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ing business in South Africa. 8  Before the meeting, the Board con-
sulted its experts and heard that divestment might "transgress the
prudent expert rule."8 9 The Board therefore voted on a resolution
prior to meeting with the Coalition not to divest state funds from
South Africa.90 When Coalition members objected to the Board's
deciding the issue before hearing their presentation, the Board
granted them another hearing."' After that hearing, the Board re-
adopted its previous resolution. The Coalition members then un-
successfully sued the Board for violation of their constitutional
rights to know and participate.92
The Coalition's experience illustrates the futility of exercising
constitutional rights to participate in investment decisions gov-
erned solely by the prudent expert standard. Under that standard,
the Board of Investments not only need not, but also must not
respond to citizens' concerns, and instead must respond only to the
prudent expert. The standard is thus anti-democratic, removing
investment decisions from public debate and consigning them to
nonpersuadable experts. The convention delegates rejected the
rule of financial experts over state investment programs. Legisla-
tive implementation of the constitutional investment provi-
sion-including the statutory prudent expert standard-has insu-
lated the state investment agency from meaningful public
participation, however.
B. Instate Investment
The minority proposal that the convention finally adopted
also spelled out investment priorities first to secure the principal of
state trusts, second to invest in Montana, and only last to achieve
return on investments. The constitutional provision itself, however,
failed to reflect these priorities. Eleven years of legislative struggles
passed before an overwhelmingly popular ballot initiative in 1983
established an instate investment program. 3 Meanwhile, the dic-
tates of the national capital markets, heeded by the prudent ex-
perts, had always deprived Montana businesses of necessary
capital.94
88. Montana Peace Legislative Coalition v. Reber, No. CDV-85-1214, Op. and Order at
3 (Mont. 1st Judicial Dist. Mar. 3, 1986).
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id. The right to know and the right of participation are found within Montana's
Declaration of Rights at MONT. CONST. art. I, §§ 9, 8 respectively.
93. MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 17-6-301 to -331 (1989).
94. See TOOLE, supra note 10, at 286-87.
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Indeed, the prudent expert standard still functions to keep
most of Montana's money out of Montana. The 1983 initiative
earmarked but twenty-five percent of one trust, the Coal Tax
Trust Fund, for instate investment.9 5 As of 1988, therefore, Mon-
tana had invested only 163 million of its 2.6 billion dollars in pub-
lic funds within its borders.96 The Board of Investments devoted
the vast majority of the 163 million dollars invested instate to pro-
viding a secondary market for Montana home mortgages. 7 Small,
indigenous Montana businesses qualifying under the instate in-
vestment initiative received less than eight million dollars in state
loan commitments.9 8 Only abrogation of the prudent expert stan-
dard in the legislation enabling instate investment made the capi-
tal available to Montana businesses at all.9"
Montana's resource extraction economy, long at the mercy of
national and international swings,100 compels a more concerted in-
state investment program, as the convention delegates realized. Big
businesses hardly require Montana's comparatively paltry state
capital resources, and Montana cannot hope to compete with other
states in the nationwide "race to the bottom" in providing lures for
big business relocation here.101 Montana can, however, provide
badly needed capital and other support to its own small busi-
nesses, small businesses which in fact employ most Montanans.
Recalling the disaster of the School Land Trust Fund Farm Loan
program, Delegate Artz insisted that Montana's trust principal re-
main secure. A concern for security has not deprived Montana
small businesses of capital resources, however. Rather, the prudent
expert standard's requirement for maximizing profits keeps Mon-
tana capital from Montana use. Were the legislature to abide the
convention's investment scheme, it would redefine return on in-
vestments as strengthening Montana's home-grown economy.
C. Conflicts of Interest
The convention delegates hoped that a constitutional limit
permitting investment only in fixed yield bonds would prevent a
state conflict of interest between ownership in and regulation of
95. MONT. CODE ANN. § 17-6-305 (1989).
96. BOARD OF INVESTMENTS, supra note 2, at 2.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 2, 7.
99. MONT. CODE ANN. § 17-6-309 (1989).
100. See TOOLE, supra note 10, at 286-87.
101. See Note, Problem With State Aid to New or Expanding Businesses, 58 S. CAL.
L. REV. 1029 (1985).
1990] FINANCE 393
16
Montana Law Review, Vol. 51 [1990], Iss. 2, Art. 10
https://scholarship.law.umt.edu/mlr/vol51/iss2/10
MONTANA LAW REVIEW
corporations operating in Montana. Of course, the constitutional
safeguard does not apply to investment of state retirement funds,
which comprise over fifty percent of Montana capital assets. 1 2
Moreover, although the limit frees the rest of Montana trust funds
from threats of immediate loss of yield from a security should state
regulation adversely affect the issuing corporation's earnings, it
fails to prevent Montana from investing against its own interests.
Whether the state invests in stocks or bonds, Montana investments
represent significant state financial support for those corporations
chosen for investment'0 3 and Montana investments help further
those corporation's policies. Montana invests against its own inter-
ests, for example, when it on the one hand espouses certain envi-
ronmental or human rights policies and on the other invests in any
corporation regardless of the corporation's environmental or
human rights practices. The prudent expert standard, blind as it is
to every investment criteria except security and maximizing re-
turns, now results in "facially neutral" and hence socially unscru-
pulous investment strategies. Three examples illustrate this result,
but analysis of Montana's investment portfolio undoubtedly would
reveal other socially questionable investment decisions.
First, in 1982 Montana voters passed a ballot initiative declar-
ing their opposition to "any further testing, development, or de-
ployment of nuclear weapons by any nation."'0 4 Although the peo-
ple of Montana established firm state policy against nuclear
weapons testing, development, and deployment, the Board of In-
vestments followed only its prudent expert standard. By 1985,
then, Montana had invested 73 million dollars in nuclear weapons
manufacturers." 5 To invest in nuclear weapons manufacturers robs
substance from the people's declared opposition to nuclear weap-
ons testing, development, and deployment. The Montana Peace
Legislative Coalition therefore supported a bill in the 1985 Legisla-
ture to divest from Montana's portfolio twenty-six nuclear weap-
ons manufacturer holdings then comprising about five percent of
the portfolio.0 ' The Board of Investments lobbied heavily against
the bill, arguing it contravened the prudent expert standard. 0 7
102. BOARD OF INVESTMENTS, supra note 2, at 13.
103. See Huber v. Groff, 171 Mont. 442, 558 P.2d 1124 (1976) for discussion broaching
though not specifically addressing this concern.
104. MONT. CODE ANN. § 90-5-211 (1989).
105. Hearings on H.B. 645, 49th Leg. (Testimony of B. Turk Feb. 15, 1985) [hereinaf-
ter Turk].
106. H.B. 645, 49th Leg. (1985) (sponsor of the Bill Mike Kadas); Turk, supra note
105.
107. See Fiscal Note to H.B. 645, 49th Leg. (1985).
[Vol. 51
17
Fitzgerald: Montana's Constitutionally Established Investment Program: A State Investing Against Itself
Published by The Scholarly Forum @ Montana Law, 1990
FINANCE
The Board of Investments prevailed, and so it remains seemingly
free to thwart Montana's antinuclear policy through its investment
strategies.108
The Board of Investments' arguments before the 1985 Legisla-
ture betrayed more of a concern for agency autonomy-that innate
attribute of bureaucracy the progressive 1972 Constitution had at-
tempted to curb-than for sound financial management. As the
Coalition pointed out, nuclear weapons divestment would have di-
minished potential diversification by eliminating only 250 of the
6,350 companies listed on major American securities exchanges. 109
Moreover, while the Board of Investments complained of the
transaction expenses associated with selling the twenty-six hold-
ings in controversy, its own annual report revealed that in three
months the Board had conducted as many transactions as the di-
vestment bill would have required over three years.110 Finally, the
Board could advance scant evidence to suggest that divestment
from nuclear weapons manufacturers would diminish returns.
Rather, the experience of other states' and cities' socially responsi-
ble investment programs showed no adverse effects on portfolio
earnings."' It appears, then, that the Board of Investments raised
the prudent expert standard as a shield against public involvement
in its decisions rather than as a sound financial principle on which
to oppose divestment.
Even had the Board shown that divestment contravened the
prudent expert standard by diminishing portfolio earnings, under
the 1972 Constitution it remains a legislative prerogative to sacri-
fice the potential for earnings in favor of implementing other state
policies. The convention itself clearly rejected maximizing returns
as the overriding criterion for investment decisions. Rather, after
assuring the safety of the principal, the most important criterion
for convention delegates was the advancement of state policies
such as Montana economic growth and pollution control.
Second, overriding constitutional concerns should have com-
pelled divestment from South Africa regardless of the possible
breach of the prudent expert standard. The 1972 Constitution ab-
solutely prohibits discrimination on the basis of race." 2 The Board
of Investments could not comply with this constitutional prohibi-
108. Note that Montana also has invested in nuclear-energy utilities although state
policy forbids the development of nuclear energy in Montana.
109. Turk, supra note 105, at 1 and studies cited therein.
110. Id. at 2.
111. See id. at 3 and studies cited therein.
112. MONT. CONST. art. II, § 4.
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tion and yet grant Montana financial support to companies operat-
ing in the South African apartheid system. Nonetheless, and as in
the case of nuclear weapons, the Board of Investments argued that
the prudent expert standard precluded divestment from South Af-
rica."' As of 1985, Montana had 228 million dollars, about ten per-
cent of its trust assets, invested in companies doing business in
South Africa."'
As in the case of nuclear weapons divestment, convincing fi-
nancial evidence refuted Board of Investment arguments and
showed that divestment, if anything, might strengthen the safety
of Montana's investment portfolio."' Indeed, Montana's financial
implication in apartheid has declined as corporations voluntarily
ceased their South African operations.1 6 Even were divestment to
result in diminished returns, however, fidelity to Montana's consti-
tutional equal rights provision should have mandated divestment.
Montana's declaration of human rights is ephemeral when Mon-
tana's capital supports known violators of human rights.
Third, the Board of Investments pursues investment strategies
inimical to Montana's economic well-being. In its 1987-1988 Fiscal
Year Report, the Board of Investments proudly announced the in-
vestment of 25.3 million dollars of Montana's capital assets in "the
rapidly growing and highly-rewarding" field of leveraged buy-
outs. 17 The Board invested these funds with a firm that partici-
pated in the leveraged buy outs of Stop & Shop, Seaman's Furni-
ture, and Duracell, as well as the bankruptcy proceedings of Tex-
aco. 8 New leveraged buy-out targets included Beatrice, Motel 6,
Owens-Illinois, and Safeway." 9 As the Board observed, sharehold-
ers can realize tremendous profits during leveraged buy outs from
the liquidation of company assets usually required to finance the
buy out. 20
The dismemberment of a corporation through the sale of as-
sets to finance a buy out certainly realizes short-term gains for
shareholders. As critics have noted, however, these asset sales also
result in plant closures that devastate communities and workers
dependent upon the continuing operations of a corporation for
113. Penner, Investment Implications of South Africa Divestiture: Report to the
Montana Board of Investments (Feb. 8, 1985).
114. Turk, supra note 105, at 1.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. BOARD OF INVESTMENTS, supra note 2, at 6.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id.
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their livelihood.121 From bitter experience with the Anaconda Com-
pany, other mining operations, forest product corporations, and
railroads, Montana has learned the cruel effects of plant closures
dictated by outside financial concerns. For Montana to participate
in leveraged buy outs sure to engender such cruel effects is an eco-
nomically foolish as well as inhumane investment policy. Conven-
tion delegates worried about Montanans' propensity to risk long-
term devastation in return for short-term profit. The safeguards
the convention wrote into the constitution have failed to curb this
historical cycle, however, as the Board of Investments pursues im-
mediate return on investments without regard for future adverse
effects on Montana workers and communities.
V. TOWARD A NEW, CONSTITUTIONAL INVESTMENT POLICY
Though the convention failed to institutionalize its detailed
investment priorities in the constitution itself, convention philoso-
phy permeates the document sufficiently for Montanans to de-
mand on constitutional grounds that the state radically alter its
investment policies. First, Montanans can assert the progressive el-
ements of the constitution to force meaningful public participation
in state investment decisions. Second, the populist elements of the
document compel repeal of the prudent expert standard so that
popular will and not expert financiers' criteria can determine state
investment policies. Once freed from the anti-democratic prudent
expert standard, Montana's investment program yet requires firm
checks against state conflicts of interest and popular follies endan-
gering trust fund principal. The conservative elements of the con-
stitution provide part of those checks through the assertion that
Montanans hold funds as they do lands, in trust for future genera-
tions. Other provisions, such as the constitution's declaration of
human rights, provide further checks against state conflicts of in-
terest. All three branches of Montana state government should
heed these constitutional imperatives when deciding on proposals
to alter the state investment program.
The prudent expert standard has prevented Montanans from
controlling and benefiting from their own capital assets. As a re-
sult, Montana's investment portfolio is a picture of a state invest-
ing against its own interests and policies. Repeal of the prudent
expert standard likely will not suffice to reinvolve Montanans in
state investment decisions, however. Although Montanans have
121. See Andre, Tender Offers for Corporate Control: A Critical Analysis and Pro-
posals for Reform, 12 DEL. J. CORP. L. 866, 876-77 and accompanying notes (1987).
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well-proved their willingness to discuss and often to fight over
most other public policy issues, financial and economic policies re-
main beyond most people's sense of personal competence. Yet, in
order to vitalize their declared inalienable rights-to "a clean and
healthful environment,... enjoying and defending their lives and
liberties . . . and seeking their safety, health and happi-
ness" 22-Montanans must assert control of their capital resources.
Our constitution already provides the means for democratic con-
trol of our state resources. What we need now is the confidence in
ourselves to wield the power over our capital resources that our
constitution provides. To build that self confidence, we must again
reject the tyranny of financial experts and assert our common,
democratic sense.
122. MONT. CONST. art. II, § 3.
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